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Introduction
Researchers and other experts continue to 
debate whether the United States will have a 
shortage of physicians in the future and, if so, 
whether the government should act now to 
expand medical school capacity and encour-
age hospitals to train more residents.  Between 
2002 and 2006, three separate forecasting 
models concluded that by 2020 the demand 
for physician services will exceed the supply 
of physician services by 85,000 to 200,000 
physicians (Cooper et al., 2002; COGME, 
2005; Dill and Salsberg, 2008).  A num-
ber of states and medical specialty societies 
have likewise concluded that there currently 
is a shortage of physicians or soon will be 
(Iglehart, 2008). In response to a recommenda-
tion by the Association of American Medical 
Colleges (AAMC) that medical school capacity 
should be expanded by 30 percent, a major-
ity of medical schools have announced plans 
to increase their incoming classes.  Several 
prominent individuals and organizations have 
recommended that Congress should undo the 
provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
that capped the number of residents eligible 
for graduate medical education payments for 
hospitals (Iglehart, 2008).
On the other side of the debate is a group of 
researchers, mostly affiliated with Dartmouth 
College, who argue that the perceived short-
age of physicians is a symptom of a more 
fundamental problem rather than being the 
problem itself.  They perceive the real problem 
to be “...a largely disorganized and fragmented 
delivery system characterized by a lack of 
coordination, incomplete patient information, 
poor communication, uneven quality, and 
rising costs” (Goodman and Fisher, 2008).  
Proponents of this view recommend maintain-
ing the cap on resident funding, shifting medi-
cal education resources to primary care, and 
reforming the reimbursement system to pro-
vide incentives for integrated and coordinated 
medical care.
The outcome of this debate may be important 
for policymakers when considering whether 
and how to reform the health care system.  
Current reform discussions anticipate reducing 
the number of uninsured by about two-thirds, 
or 30 million people.  Will the United States 
have enough physicians to care for formerly 
uninsured individuals when their demand for 
medical care increases?  Will the United States 
have enough physicians even if the number 
of uninsured remains the same?  Most reform 
bills being debated in Congress are creat-
ing incentives for providers to organize into 
accountable care organizations (ACOs), which 
will emphasize primary care services, coordi-
nate care between providers, and be account-
able for health outcomes and treatment costs.  
Will the United States have enough primary 
care physicians to allow ACOs to develop 
throughout the country?
David Blumenthal (2004) provides a useful 
framework to evaluate this debate, “the debate 
on the physician workforce would be simpler 
to understand, but less interesting, were it not 
for disagreements about the methods that 
are used to predict the supply of and demand 
for physicians in the future.  Roiling beneath 
the technical disputes are strongly held views 
about the value of all medical care services and 
whether our health care system can or should 
be reformed.”  This paper provides a brief his-
tory of government involvement in physician 
workforce planning, describes and assesses the 
methods used by each side in the debate, and 
addresses the fundamental underlying views 
that determine many observers’ positions in 
this debate.
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Executive Summary
Researchers and other experts continue to 
debate whether the United States will have 
a shortage of physicians in the future and, 
if so, whether the government should act 
now to expand medical school capacity 
and encourage hospitals to train more 
residents.  Several studies have forecast that 
there will be a shortage of about 100,000 
to 200,000 physicians in 2020, and many 
medical schools are responding by expanding 
capacity.  However, a prominent group of 
researchers argue that the perceived shortage 
of physicians is a symptom of a more 
fundamental problem rather than being the 
problem itself, and expanding the supply of 
physicians would merely lead to the provision 
of relatively low-value medical care.  It is 
important for policymakers to determine 
the adequacy of physician supply as they 
consider provisions to reduce the uninsured 
and increase the demand for physician 
services.  This paper provides a brief history 
of government involvement in physician 
workforce planning, describes and assesses 
the methods used by the two sides in the 
physician-shortage debate, and addresses the 
fundamental underlying views that determine 
many observers’ positions in this debate.
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The Government’s Assessment 
of the Adequacy of Physician 
Supply: A Brief History
The U.S. government exerts a strong influ-
ence on the number and specialty mix of 
physicians and, as such, has a long history of 
trying to forecast the future supply of and 
demand for physician services.  In 1959, the 
Surgeon General’s Consultant Group on 
Medical Education published a study (known 
as the Bane Report) predicting a shortage 
of 40,000 physicians by 1975 (Blumenthal, 
2004).  The federal government responded 
to that report by providing subsidies to medi-
cal schools, which encouraged universities to 
open new medical schools and expand enroll-
ment at existing medical schools.  As a result, 
enrollment at U.S. medical schools doubled 
between 1960 and 1980, and the number of 
active physicians grew from 259,000 (145 per 
100,000 population) in 1960 to 453,000 (200 
per 100,000 population) in 1980 (American 
Medical Association, 2008).  
The government eventually became con-
cerned that its policies might have been 
too successful.  In 1976, Congress asked 
the Graduate Medical Education National 
Advisory Committee (GMENAC) to deter-
mine the number of physicians required to 
meet the health care needs of the nation, 
the most appropriate specialty distribu-
tion of these physicians, ways to achieve a 
more favorable geographic distribution of 
physicians, and how to finance graduate 
medical education (American Academy of 
Pediatrics, 1981).  The GMENAC pub-
lished a report in 1981 predicting a sur-
plus of 145,000 physicians by 2000, or 23 
percent of the projected workforce.  That 
report recommended restricting enrollment 
in U.S. medical schools and the flow of 
immigrating international medical school 
graduates (IMGs) (Blumenthal, 2004).
Congress responded to that report by 
eliminating subsidies to medical schools, 
and this achieved the intended effect—the 
number of students graduating from U.S. 
medical schools has essentially remained 
constant over the last 30 years at about 
16,300 per year.  Despite this slowdown in 
the flow of medical students, there are now 
744,000 physicians practicing in the United 
States, or about 280 per 100,000 people.  
There are two reasons why the physician 
workforce has continued to grow.  First, 
it takes about 40 years for an increase in 
the flow of medical school graduates to 
fully affect the stock of practicing physi-
cians.  Second, the prospective payment 
system instituted in 1983 provided teach-
ing hospitals with average payments (or 
subsidies) of $70,000 for each additional 
resident hired.  Not surprisingly, hospitals 
responded to those incentives by hiring 
about 6,000 to 10,000 IMGs per year as 
residents, in addition to the 16,000 U.S. 
medical school graduates.  Many of these 
IMGs decided to practice in the United 
States after completing residency training.1 
Although the resident subsidies were at 
odds with GMENAC’s recommendations, 
the primary objective of these payments 
was to prevent teaching hospitals from los-
ing substantial amounts of money in the 
new reimbursement system, not to expand 
the physician workforce (Nicholson, 2002).
Throughout the past 30 years, about one-
third of physicians in the United States 
have practiced in one of the primary care 
specialties of family practice, pediatrics, or 
general internal medicine, with the remain-
ing two-thirds in non-primary care special-
ties such as OB/GYN, psychiatry, and 
general surgery.  As managed care grew 
during the 1980s and 1990s, policymakers 
became worried that the United States was 
producing too few primary care physicians 
(or generalists).  Primary care physicians 
were believed to be instrumental to the 
success of managed care by functioning as 
gatekeepers to more expensive specialized 
(non-primary care) medicine.  Congress 
therefore created the Council on Graduate 
Medical Education (COGME) in 1986 to 
provide advice on physician workforce pol-
icies.  COGME issued a series of reports 
in the early 1990s predicting a surplus of 
specialists, a shortage of generalists, and 
an overall surplus of 80,000 physicians by 
2000.  That latter prediction confirmed 
the GMENAC’s earlier estimate, although 
COGME’s projected surplus was smaller. 
COGME also recommended capping hos-
pital residency positions at 110 percent of 
the number of U.S. medical school gradu-
ates and enacting policies to ensure that 50 
percent of newly-trained physicians would 
enter primary care specialties.  Because 
there were 40 percent more residency posi-
tions than U.S. medical school graduates at 
the time, enforcing the former recommen-
dation would most likely have translated 
into fewer IMG residents (and subse-
quently fewer practicing physicians).  The 
Clinton Health Security Act, which failed 
to gain congressional support in 1994, 
would have implemented COGME’s rec-
ommendations in their entirety.2   In 1997, 
Congress did cap the number of residency 
positions that were eligible for graduate 
medical education payments, which slowed 
the growth in the number of residents (and 
IMGs) trained at teaching hospitals.  
As is evident from this 40-year review, 
government policy has been influenced 
strongly by the recommendations of vari-
ous councils.  Because economists are con-
fident that the labor market determines 
the “correct” number of workers in most 
professions, it is worth discussing why 
the government is involved in physician 
manpower planning at all.  Surpluses and 
shortages are usually self-correcting.  If a 
certain group of professionals is willing 
to supply more services than consumers 
are willing to buy at the prevailing price, 
competition between professionals should 
drive down prices and income.  Increased 
In January 2009, the Changes in Health 
Care Financing and Organization (HCFO) 
Initiative convened an invitational work 
group meet ing as part of its program, 
2009 Policy Reform: Implications of 
the Supply and Organization of the 
Delivery System on Health Care Reform, 
sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation. The work group, co-chaired 
by Robert Berenson, M.D., and Harold 
Luft, Ph.D., commissioned several 
papers, including this background paper 
by Sean Nicholson, Ph.D. 
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competition will make the occupation less 
attractive, thereby reducing the number of 
college graduates entering the profession.  
The reduced flow of professionals will 
increase prices/fees and income until the 
financial return to education and training is 
once again commensurate with the return 
in other professions.  Conversely, if there 
is a shortage such that customers must wait 
months to schedule an appointment with a 
certain type of professional, customers will 
bid up fees and incomes will rise.  Higher 
incomes will encourage a greater number 
of students to enter the profession until 
long run supply again equals demand.
There are several possible justifications for 
government involvement in determining 
the number and specialty mix of physi-
cians.  First, there is a considerable lag 
between when students apply to medical 
school and when they begin practicing 
medicine in a particular specialty.  If the 
government knows there will be a future 
shortage or specialty imbalance, it would 
be prudent to act before the shortage actu-
ally manifests itself.  Nevertheless, it’s not 
clear whether GMENAC or COGME are 
able to forecast future demand and supply 
conditions any better than prospective phy-
sicians, who clearly have substantial private 
incentives to acquire good information.  
Second, consumers/patients are not as well 
informed about their health, available treat-
ment alternatives, and the quality of health 
care providers as the providers themselves.  
Requiring physicians to attend an accred-
ited medical school in order to be licensed 
is a way to assure patients that practicing 
physicians are of sufficiently high quality.  
But because patients rely heavily on physi-
cian recommendations, physicians may 
be able to induce demand for their own 
services.  Therefore, if “too many” physi-
cians are trained, physicians could shift out 
demand for their services such that their 
fee would not fall as it would in a mar-
ket where consumers are well informed.  
People who believe physicians can and do 
induce demand for their own services are 
also likely to view constraining the supply 
of physicians as a means of preventing an 
increase in low-value medical services.  As 
discussed in the following section, the cur-
rent debate regarding whether there will be 
a shortage of physicians is fundamentally a 
debate regarding whether physicians induce 
demand (consciously or subconsciously) 
for their own services and the value of 
increased medical spending. 
Recent Models Predicting a 
Shortage of Physicians by 2020
How accurate were the GMENAC and 
COGME predictions of a physician surplus 
in 2000?  Most people have concluded 
that the forecasts were not accurate at all.  
Although the mean physician income in 
the United States fell by nine percent in 
real terms between 1993 and 2000, each 
newly trained primary care resident in the 
beginning of this decade was receiving an 
average of about three job offers, whereas 
newly trained specialist residents were 
receiving about four offers (Nolan et al., 
2002).  One explanation for the inaccuracy 
is that the models were unable to forecast 
the rejection by consumers of the tightly 
managed, primary care-centered HMO 
model in favor of the more open-access 
PPO model.  Another explanation is that 
the growth in gross domestic product (i.e., 
national income) and population between 
1980 and 2000 increased patients’ demands 
for physician services, while the growth of 
female physicians in the workforce reduced 
the effective supply of physician services 
because they work fewer hours, on aver-
age, than their male colleagues.
Cooper, Getzen, McKee, and Laud 
emphasized this latter explanation in their 
influential 2002 paper published in Health 
Affairs.3  They begin by assuming that in 
the baseline year, 2000, the demand for 
physician services is equal to the observed 
supply of physician services.  Demand and 
supply are then separately forecast to 2020 
based on key underlying trends.  Economic 
expansion and population growth are 
assumed to be the key drivers of changes 
in the demand for physician services, while 
the changing work effort of physicians and 
the supply of non-physician clinicians (e.g., 
nurse practitioners and physician assis-
tants) are assumed to be the key drivers 
of changes in the supply of physician ser-
vices.  The most novel contribution of the 
model is the assertion that an increase in a 
country’s income drives an increase in the 
demand for physician services; Cooper and 
colleagues forecasted the supply of physi-
cians in a fairly traditional manner.  Details 
on their method of forecasting the demand 
for and supply of physician services are 
presented in the Technical Appendix.
When Cooper et al. (2002) applied the 
forecasted growth in income, population, 
changing demographics of the physician 
workforce, and growth in the supply of 
physician substitutes to their model, they 
concluded that the demand for physician 
services will exceed the effective supply 
of physician services by 50,000 physicians 
in 2010, and by 200,000 in 2020.4  As a 
result, Cooper et al. recommended that the 
United States increase the number of resi-
dents trained per year by 10,000 (about 40 
percent) to reduce the impending physician 
shortage (Croasdale, 2007).  
The work by Cooper and his colleagues 
convinced COGME in 2005 to update and 
modify its physician forecasting model.  
COGME’s supply projection is almost 
identical (i.e., only 0.7 percent higher) to 
that of Cooper and colleagues.  The real 
difference with the Cooper et al. (2002) 
model is on the demand side.  COGME 
(2005) estimated the demand for physi-
cian services using a microanalysis typical 
of physician forecasting models.  First, the 
U.S. population is assigned to age-gender-
location-insurance status cells (e.g., 18-44 
year-old females living in an urban area 
and enrolled in a fee-for-service health 
plan).  Second, current physician-popula-
tion ratios are applied to each cell.  Third, 
the increase in the demand for physician 
services that occurred between 1990 and 
2000 is assumed to continue throughout 
the 2000-2020 period.  Details on the 
COGME (2005) method are described in 
the Technical Appendix.
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COGME estimates that there will be a 
supply of 1,025,000 physicians in 2020.   
Although they formed several demand 
forecasts, COGME’s preferred estimate of 
the demand for physician services in 2020 
is 1,110,000 physicians.  This implies that 
there will be a predicted shortage of 85,000 
physicians in 2020, a little less than half 
the shortage forecasted by Cooper et al. 
(2002).5  Based on their analysis, COGME 
recommended expanding U.S. medical 
school enrollment by 15 percent and elimi-
nating the cap on the number of residents 
eligible for graduate medical education 
subsidies.  
States and specialty societies are echoing 
the conclusions of Cooper et al. (2002) and 
COGME (2005).  Fourteen states have issued 
reports since 2000 concluding that there is or 
soon will be a shortage of physicians (Iglehart, 
2008).  Between 2003 and 2008, 16 specialty 
societies issued studies that come to a similar 
conclusion (Edward Salsberg, May 9, 2008 
presentation).  In June 2006 the AAMC rec-
ommended a 30 percent increase in medical 
school capacity—double the COGME (2005) 
recommendation but smaller than that of 
Cooper et al. (2002).  The American Medical 
Association also generally supports expanding 
capacity.
Medical schools have responded to those 
recommendations and the seeming consen-
sus view that there will be an impending 
shortage of physicians.  According to a 2006 
study, 93 of the 126 U.S. medical schools 
have already or are planning to increase 
class sizes above their 2002 levels.  Based 
on a 2007 survey, the AAMC estimates that 
by 2012 first-year medical school enroll-
ment will be 21 percent higher than it was 
in 2002, and 30 percent higher by 2017.  
Moreover, about 10 new medical schools 
are expected to open by 2015 (Iglehart, 
2008).  However, those actions will not nec-
essarily increase the future physician work-
force by 30 percent.  If the resident caps on 
graduate medical financing remain in place 
and teaching hospitals choose not to offer 
new residency positions at lower (perhaps 
negative) wages, the expansion of U.S. med-
ical schools may just displace IMGs without 
changing substantially the number of resi-
dents completing training each year.
An Opposing Opinion
David Goodman and many colleagues 
at Dartmouth believe that the perceived 
shortage of physicians is a symptom of 
the problem rather than the problem 
itself.  Rather than adding more physicians, 
proponents of this view favor reforming 
payment systems to promote integrated 
and coordinated medical care, reallocating 
medical education funding toward primary 
care, and maintaining the cap on graduate 
medical education financing.  
Goodman’s argument begins with the 
observation that there is substantial 
variation between health referral regions 
(HRRs) in the number of physicians per 
capita.  Specifically, the mean physician 
per capita ratio in regions in the highest 
quintile is 50 percent higher than regions in 
the lowest quintile (Goodman and Fisher, 
2008).  That variation is greater than the 
predicted shortage of physicians in 2020 
in all of the models reviewed above.  They 
find no evidence that the variation is 
driven by differences in patients’ health 
status or preferences for how they would 
like to be treated.  For example, there 
is no statistical relationship between the 
number of neonatologists per birth in a 
region and the percentage of births that are 
low birth weight (Goodman et al., 2002), 
nor any relationship between the number 
of cardiologists per capita in a HRR and 
the number of heart attacks per Medicare 
enrollee (Wennberg, 2000).  Likewise, there 
is no relationship between how intensively 
Medicare beneficiaries would like to be 
treated and physician supply.
Furthermore, there is little evidence that 
people living in regions with a relatively 
large supply of physicians receive better 
quality care, experience superior health out-
comes, are more satisfied with their care, 
or have better perceived access to care rela-
tive to people living in regions with fewer 
physicians per capita. For example, birth 
outcomes are not significantly better in 
regions with the highest number of neona-
tologists per birth relative to regions in the 
second, third, or fourth quintiles in terms 
of neonatologist supply (Goodman et al., 
2002).  Heart attack and congestive heart 
failure patients in regions with a relatively 
large number of physicians per capita are 
only slightly more likely to receive recom-
mended processes of care (e.g., beta block-
ers within 24 hours of admission) than 
patients in regions with fewer physicians 
(Goodman and Fisher, 2008).  Finally, 
there is little difference in Medicare ben-
eficiaries’ perceptions of access to care and 
satisfaction with care across regions with 
differing physician supply (The Dartmouth 
Institute for Health Policy & Clinical 
Practice, 2008). 
Regions with relatively large physician-
to-populations ratios do generate higher 
medical spending than other regions.  If one 
categorizes HRRs according to how much 
is spent on Medicare beneficiaries in their 
last six months of life, regions in the most 
expensive quintile have 31 percent more 
physicians per capita than regions in the 
lowest quintile.  Furthermore, the expensive 
regions have fewer family practitioners and 
more medical and surgical specialists than 
the relatively inexpensive regions.  The 
executive summary to the 2008 Dartmouth 
Atlas offers the following assessment for 
why regional variations in spending and 
physician supply do not appear to generate 
superior health outcomes: 
The likely explanation for both the 
dramatic differences in spending and 
the strong correlations with supply lies 
in the lack of firm scientific evidence 
available to guide most clinical deci-
sions; the general assumption among 
both physicians and patients that 
more medical care means better care; 
the marked variations in supply that 
emerge in an unplanned marketplace; 
and a fee-for-service payment system 
that rewards providers for staying 
busy.  Physicians adapt their practices 
subliminally to the available resources.   
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From the primary care physician’s 
perspective, for example, it will often 
seem more efficient to refer to a spe-
cialist or admit to the hospital if those 
resources are available and payments 
for office-based primary care have 
been constrained.  The key element 
of the theory is that because so many 
clinical decisions are in the ‘gray areas’ 
of medicine where evidence is now 
lacking (how often to see a patient, 
when to refer to a specialist, when to 
admit), any expansion of capacity will 
result in subtle shifts of clinical judg-
ment toward greater intensity of care.
Baicker and Chandra (2004) find that the 
specialty mix of physicians in a region 
does matter.  Specifically, states where 
family practitioners represent a relatively 
large percentage of practicing physicians 
tend to spend less per Medicare benefi-
ciary and have higher quality of care, as 
measured by a composite of 24 process 
measures for treating six common medi-
cal conditions.  Conversely, spending is 
higher and quality is worse in states where 
specialists represent a relatively large per-
centage of physicians.  They do not find a 
correlation between the number of nurses 
per capita and either spending or quality at 
the state level.
What is likely to happen if the physi-
cian workforce expands?  According to 
Goodman (2004), between 1979 and 1999 
almost 80 percent of newly trained phy-
sicians were located in areas where the 
physician-to-population ratio was already 
high (i.e., the top three quartiles in 1979).  
Based on the quote above, adding physi-
cians to areas that are already expensive 
will create additional capacity, lead pri-
mary care physicians to refer more “bor-
derline” patients to specialists, generate 
more low-value visits/procedures, and will 
exacerbate spending without improving 
health outcomes.
If one accepts the argument advanced 
by Goodman and his Dartmouth col-
leagues, what policies should be adopted?  
The executive summary of the 2008 
Dartmouth Atlas compares Medicare 
spending and use of physicians for 
Medicare beneficiaries in their last two 
years of life across the academic medi-
cal centers ranked in the top five of the 
U.S. News and World Report 2007 Honor 
Roll for America’s Best Hospitals.  At the 
University of California, Los Angeles, an 
average of 38.5 physicians were involved 
in each patient’s medical care and 
Medicare spent $94,000 per beneficiary, 
whereas at the Mayo Clinic only 20.3 phy-
sicians were involved and Medicare spent 
$53,000.  Goodman and Fisher recom-
mend: 1) maintaining the cap on graduate 
medical education funding; 2) shifting 
medical education funding toward primary 
care specialties; and 3) instituting a pay-
ment system that provides incentives for 
the integrated, coordinated, and efficient 
care that appears to be provided by the 
Mayo Clinic.
Critique of the Forecasting 
Models and the Dartmouth View
Some economists and policymakers 
dismiss the predictions of Cooper et al. 
(2002), COGME (2005), and the Health 
Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA) due to general skepticism about 
the ability of anyone to forecast the 
health care market far into the future.  As 
Reinhart (2002) mentions in the same 
Health Affairs issue where the Cooper et 
al. (2002) article appears, “It is a daunt-
ing enterprise to estimate the physician 
surplus or shortage one or two decades 
into the future.”  An example of the dif-
ficulty of forecasting the future health care 
market is occurring right before our eyes.  
Health insurers have responded to the 
persistent rise in medical costs by setting 
increasingly higher patient cost sharing 
for physician visits and prescription drugs. 
Presumably as a result, the number of 
prescriptions filled fell by 0.5 and 2.0 per-
cent in the first two quarters of 2008, and 
the number of physician office visits has 
been trending down since 2006.6  That is 
an example of how the health care market 
evolves in ways that are difficult for mod-
elers to anticipate.  
Skepticism of models is bolstered by 
the inaccuracy of previous models such 
as the 1981 GMENAC report, the 
COGME studies of the early 1990s, a 
Pew Commission report that projected 
a surplus of 150,000 physicians, and an 
Institute of Medicine prediction that man-
aged care would reduce the demand for 
physician services.  If previous models 
were not able to accurately forecast the 
health care market 20 years hence, why 
should we expect version 2.0 or 3.0 to 
be any better?  One way modelers have 
responded to that concern is by creating 
a series of alternative scenarios that allow 
for a range of estimates of key parameters: 
changes in age-specific demand for physi-
cian visits, physician productivity, number 
and degree of substitutability of non-phy-
sician clinicians, and relationship between 
income and the demand for physician 
services.  But, this modeling approach 
comes with a cost: how does one identify 
the most likely scenario among a host of 
possible scenarios, and does the role for 
discretion make the exercise less objec-
tive and more prone to partisan politics?  
In defense of the modelers, though, for 
purposes of setting physician workforce 
policy, it may be more important to 
understand whether there is likely to be a 
reasonably large shortage of physicians in 
the future than knowing the precise mag-
nitude of any shortage.  That is, the gov-
ernment could encourage the expansion 
of medical school capacity now and post-
pone a decision on whether to encourage 
teaching hospitals to hire more residents 
until more data are collected regarding a 
shortage.  In the meantime, IMGs could 
continue to serve as a means of adjusting 
the workforce in the short run. 
All existing models make the convenient 
assumption that at the beginning of the 
forecast period supply is equal to demand, 
but in the future supply and demand are 
forecasted separately.  In fact, the whole 
point of the exercise is to see if supply and 
demand diverge from one another.  The 
Dartmouth criticism of this approach is that 
in the baseline period, many of the physician 
visits might be unnecessary (i.e., demand is 
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too high because it is determined, subtly, by 
capacity and physicians’ recommendations), 
so the model builds in current inefficien-
cies.  Economists are comfortable with the 
idea that if prices are regulated (e.g., set “too 
low”), the observed quantity of physician 
visits could differ from the quantity at the 
point where the supply and demand curves 
intersect.  But how does one know when 
supply and demand are truly equal to one 
another and when they would be equal if 
not for a shortage or surplus of physicians?  
Barer (2002) expresses this concern when 
evaluating Cooper et al. (2002): “But this 
artificial ‘conceptual link’ between supply and 
demand, so important historically, alas has a 
short half-life.  When it comes to the future, 
the conceptual link becomes an incon-
venience and the umbilical cord is cut—
‘projections of future demand [are] based 
on these historic trends [but] compared with 
separate projections of physician supply’.”  
Some people have questioned the asser-
tion by Cooper and his colleagues that 
there is a causal relationship between a 
county’s GDP and demand for physi-
cian services.  Cooper et al. (2002) argue, 
sometimes implicitly, that as income rises 
patients demand more physician services, 
and physicians respond to this patient-ini-
tiated demand by supplying more services. 
Reinhart (2002) posits an alternative expla-
nation for the correlation between income 
and the number of observed physicians: 
teaching hospitals hired IMGs as a cheap 
source of labor, and physicians conscious-
ly or subconsciously induce demand for 
their own services as supply/competition 
increases.  Because income has increased 
over time in the United States, any factor 
that is increasing over time and is omitted 
from the model could generate the cor-
relation reported by Cooper et al. (2002).7  
COGME (2005) seems skeptical of the 
causal interpretation as does HRSA, which 
is COGME’s parent organization.  HRSA 
issued its own physician manpower pro-
jection in 2006.  As part of the analysis, 
they performed cross-section regressions 
similar to those run by Cooper and  
colleagues and found an income elasticity 
50 percent smaller than the 0.75 figure.  
This smaller estimate, which was not 
statistically significant, is similar in mag-
nitude to a separate estimate by Koenig 
et al. (2003).  In spite of those concerns, 
COGME concludes that there will be a 
physician shortage in 2020 without relying 
on the scenario that posits a causal rela-
tionship between income and demand for 
physician services.8
One of the central conclusions of the 
Dartmouth studies—places that spend 
more on medical care do not generally 
have superior health outcomes—has been 
challenged by a number of recent stud-
ies.  David Cutler, for example, shows 
that although spending on medical care 
has increased substantially over the past 
several decades, the value of the benefits 
due to health improvements exceed the 
increased cost.  Those studies are usually 
conducted for a single disease at a time, 
and have been reported for the treat-
ment of heart attacks (Cutler et al., 1998), 
depression (Berndt et al., 2002), neonatal 
intensive care (Cutler, 2004), and colorec-
tal cancer (Lucarelli and Nicholson, 2009). 
How does one reconcile the conclusion 
of these studies with the Dartmouth view 
that increases in medical spending (and 
increases in physician supply) are not 
associated with higher-quality medical care 
or health outcomes in the cross-section—
when comparing HRRs at a point in time? 
One way to reconcile the two sets of 
results is to argue that while many new 
expensive medical technologies have 
indeed improved health outcomes, some 
regional health care systems are able to 
incorporate technologies more efficiently 
than others (Skinner and Staiger, 2007).  
Although this may be true, another pos-
sible explanation is that there are impor-
tant regional factors, such as preferences 
for how patients want to be treated or 
patient illness severity, that are difficult 
to measure.  That could explain why cer-
tain regions have simultaneously more 
physicians, higher costs, and average/bad 
health outcomes.  Economists are often 
skeptical of inferring causality from cross-
section analyses.  The Dartmouth group 
is keenly aware of this and addresses the 
concern about unobserved variables in 
most of its papers.  For example, focusing 
on spending in the last six months or two 
years of a patient’s life is one way to try to 
standardize for patient illness severity (i.e., 
ultimately the outcome was the same for 
all patients).
There are two recent papers that try 
to estimate the causal effect of medi-
cal spending on health using a different 
approach than the cross-sectional analyses 
favored by the Dartmouth group.  Doyle 
(2007) examines people who experience 
a health emergency (e.g., heart attack or 
stroke) while visiting Florida.  Presumably, 
these people did not choose their travel 
destination based on their own health or 
the capabilities of the city’s health care 
system.  Doyle finds that visitors who had 
a health emergency in a relatively high-
spending region experience better health 
outcomes than visitors to low-spending 
regions.  Almond et al. (2008) compare 
health outcomes of babies with a birth 
weight just below 1,500 grams to babies 
with a birth weight just above this thresh-
old.  The former babies receive substan-
tially more medical care than the latter, on 
average, due to clinical guidelines based on 
the very-low birth weight threshold.  They 
find that the slightly lighter babies are less 
likely to die over the first year.  Those two 
studies indicate that greater spending is 
associated with better health outcomes.  It 
is important to point out, however, that 
the studies examine the causal effect of 
more spending, not the causal effect of 
greater physician availability.
Cooper engaged the Dartmouth group 
in a lively written debate recently in a 
series of articles in the December 4, 2008 
Health Affairs web exclusive.  Cooper 
(2008) disputed the Baicker and Chandra 
(2004) conclusion that states with a higher 
mix of specialists provide higher quality 
care by showing that states with more 
specialists per capita have higher quality, 
and (separately) states with more family 
practitioners per capita have higher qual-
ity.  Baicker and Chandra (2008) point out 
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that the two results are compatible: the 
absolute number of each type of physician 
can matter as well as the specialty mix of 
physicians (controlling for the number).  
Baicker and Chandra emphasize that the 
beneficial effect of family practitioners 
on quality is 10 times larger than the 
beneficial effect of specialists on qual-
ity (if one accepts that there is indeed a 
causal relationship).  In a separate paper, 
Cooper (2008b) shows that if one uses 
total spending, rather than spending on 
Medicare beneficiaries only, states that 
spend a relatively large amount per patient 
do provide higher quality medical care.  
Skinner et al. (2008) respond by raising 
some valid questions regarding whether 
the non-Medicare spending variable is 
really capturing what it is intended to.
Conclusion
Should the federal government imple-
ment policies to increase the supply of 
physician services, thereby reducing the 
chances of there being a future shortage?  
The answer depends less on whether one 
believes the methods used by Cooper et 
al. (2002), COGME (2005), and the group 
of Dartmouth researchers, than on one’s 
fundamental attitude regarding whether 
additional medical services are worth their 
cost. Blumenthal (2004) points out a use-
ful framework for evaluating whether the 
United States should actively expand the 
physician workforce:
The physician-supply debate is there-
fore now enmeshed in and inseparable 
from a larger discussion about the 
value of the services physicians pro-
vide and the future of the health care 
system—how big it should be, how 
to organize it, and whether its trajec-
tory can be controlled.  Proponents of 
the deficit theory argue that ignoring 
or resisting inevitable increases in the 
demand for physicians’ services will 
only lead to ‘public discontent’ and 
invite other health care profession-
als to take over the roles traditionally 
played by physicians.  Proponents of 
the surplus theory seem to believe that 
constraining the supply of physicians 
is one way to begin restructuring our 
health care system in order to improve 
its rationality and efficiency.
Although there are some technical issues 
that should be evaluated critically, most 
people’s assessments regarding whether 
the United States will face a shortage 
or surplus of physicians in the future 
depends on two beliefs: 1) whether poli-
cymakers have the willingness and abil-
ity to reform the health care system and 
improve its efficiency; and 2) whether 
when more physicians begin practicing in 
the United States, the value of the “new” 
services will exceed their cost?  
Consider people who are skeptical that 
policymakers (or the market on its own) 
can reform the health care system in a way 
that will improve physicians’ productivity, 
and who believe that consumers are well 
informed and physicians cannot or do not 
induce demand for their own services.  
Those people are likely to support an 
expansion of the workforce in anticipation 
of growth in demand for physician ser-
vices due to the growth and aging of the 
population.  
Now consider people who are optimis-
tic that policymakers (or the market on 
its own) can reform payment systems 
to improve physician productivity, who 
believe that expanding the physician work-
force will take pressure off policymakers 
and make reform less likely, and who 
believe additional physicians would gen-
erate relatively low-value services in the 
existing market.  Such people are likely to 
favor maintaining a cap on graduate medi-
cal education funding. 
About the Author: 
Sean Nicholson, Ph.D., is an associate 
professor at Cornell University. 
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Cooper, Getzen, McKee, and Laud 
(2002/2003)
Cooper et al. (2002) and Cooper, Getzen, 
and Laud (2003) describe a series of regres-
sions that support their overall conclusion 
that a one percent increase in a country’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) causes the 
demand for physician services to increase by 
0.75 percent, on average.  First, they regressed 
the percentage change in the number of 
physicians in the United States between each 
10-year period of time (between 1929 and 
2000) on the percentage change in GDP for 
the prior 10-year period.1  Second, they per-
formed similar longitudinal regressions for 
other OECD countries.  Third, they regressed 
each state’s physician-to-population ratio at a 
point in time on the state’s per capita income.  
Finally, they performed similar cross-section 
regressions for countries and (separately) met-
ropolitan statistical areas in the United States.    
In order to forecast the supply of physi-
cians, they assumed that the number of first-
year residents would remain at its current 
level (23,000), 80 percent of IMGs would 
practice in the United States upon com-
pleting their training, and physicians in the 
future would continue to retire at the same 
ages as they do currently.  Older physicians 
are assumed to work fewer hours than 
younger physicians and females are assumed 
to work 20 percent fewer hours than males.  
Finally, they forecasted a growth of approxi-
mately 180,000 non-physician clinicians by 
2015.  These clinicians are converted into 
physician-equivalent units based on the per-
centage of their time devoted to providing 
traditional physician services. 
COGME (2005)
To forecast the supply of physician services, 
COGME assumes that 16,000 medical stu-
dents will continue to graduate from U.S. 
medical schools each year, 5,200 IMGs will 
continue to be hired at teaching hospitals each 
year, the percentage of physicians choosing 
each specialty will remain the same, and physi-
cians will work the same number of hours per 
year and retire at the same ages as currently.  
COGME supplemented the baseline supply 
estimates with three scenarios: 1) physicians 
in the future work 10 percent fewer hours 
per week in order to balance professional and 
personal activities; 2) physician productivity 
improves by about one percent per year, due 
in part to greater use of information technol-
ogy; and 3) different combinations of the first 
two scenarios.
Unlike Cooper et al. (2002), per capita 
demand for physician services does not 
change over time in COGME’s baseline 
demand forecast, although it will in their 
preferred Scenario 2.  COGME projected 
that the baseline demand for physicians 
would grow by 210,000 full-time equiva-
lents (FTEs) between 2000 and 2020, or 
26 percent.  This occurs as the projected 
U.S. population grows, ages, and shifts into 
higher use “cells.”  In their baseline model, 
the demand for physicians in 2002 exceeds 
supply by only 16,000 physicians, or 1.6 
percent of projected supply.  
COGME (2005) also examines three alterna-
tive demand-side scenarios.  The first alter-
native scenario incorporates the result from 
Cooper et al. (2002) that the use of physician 
services increases by 0.75 percent, on aver-
age, for every 1.0 percent increase in GDP.  
Assuming GDP will rise by 1.0 percent per 
over the 20-year period, COGME forecasted 
a 44 percent increase in the demand for physi-
cians and a shortage of 151,000 physicians in 
2020 (using their baseline supply estimate).  
COGME disregards the “Cooper GDP sce-
nario” because “…it has not been decided 
whether there is, in fact, a causal relationship 
between economic growth and demand for 
physicians; the correlation between the two 
may be spurious.”   
In the second alternative scenario, COGME 
allows the age-specific demand for physi-
cian services to change in the future based 
on actual trends that occurred between 1980 
and 2000.  The number of visits per capita 
in the United States increased from 2.4 in 
1980 to 2.9 in 2000, an increase of 21 percent 
(COGME, 2005).  However, utilization per 
capita actually fell among 15-34 year-olds 
while rising for all other age groups except 
those over age 84.  COGME speculates 
that the development and adoption of new 
medical technologies might be driving the 
increased utilization among older age groups.  
If the age-specific utilization trends from 1990 
to 2000 continue throughout the 2000-2020 
period and there is no relationship between 
GDP and demand (scenario 1), COGME 
estimates that the demand for physicians will 
increase by 42 percent and a shortage similar 
to that of Scenario 1 will ensue.  COGME 
concludes that this second alternative demand 
scenario is most likely to occur.
In the third scenario, COGME draws on two 
strands of studies to estimate demand if low-
value “unnecessary” physician services are 
no longer provided. Fisher et al (2003a and 
2003b) highlighted that there are substantial 
differences between regions in the quantity 
of services provided, but these differences are 
not correlated (or in some cases are negatively 
correlated) with health outcomes. Separately, 
Weiner (2004), Hart et al. (1997), and 
Goodman et al. (1996) find that the demand 
for physician services in closed delivery orga-
nizations (e.g., staff model HMOs), which 
have relatively rigorous utilization review 
systems, are much lower than in other orga-
nization types.  If per capita demand could be 
reduced by 26.5 percent through the elimina-
tion of low-value services (and the levers in 
Scenario 1 and 2 are turned off), COGME 
estimates that there would be a surplus of 
246,000 physicians in 2020. COGME (2005) 
chooses to disregard this scenario predicting 
this scenario:  “As proponents of the [Fisher 
et al.] perspective admit, no safe ways cur-
rently exist to identify and eliminate unneces-
sary services.”
COGME also provides an estimate of the 
future “need” for physician services if per-
sons who are currently uninsured were able 
to obtain coverage, and if non-financial bar-
riers to medical care (e.g., racial disparities) 
were removed.  Specifically, they modify the 
demand estimates described above such that 
the currently uninsured demand as many phy-
sician services as those who are insured, and 
increase demand by two percent for all people 
due to the removal of non-financial barriers.2  
Based on those assumptions, the need for 
physician services is estimated to be nine per-
cent higher than demand. 
Endnotes 
1  For example, the percentage change in GDP 
between 1970 and 1980 is allowed to affect 
the percentage change in physicians per capita 
between 1980 and 1990.
2  COGME also presents several alternative sce-
narios of the future need for physicians.
Technical Appendix: Method of Forecasting Future Demand for Physician Services and Future Supply of 
Physician Services
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Endnotes
1  IMGs represented 25.3 percent of the physician 
workforce in the United States in 2005 (American 
Medical Association, 2008).
2  A federal authority would have ensured that one-
half of all residency positions would be in primary 
care specialties, thereby increasing the primary care 
mix over time.  
3  Richard Cooper is a physician and the former dean 
of the Medical College of Wisconsin.
4  The model assumes real per capita GDP will grow 
1.5 to 2.0 percent per year, causing the per capita 
demand for physician services to grow by 1.1 to 
1.5 percent per year.
5  The predicted shortage is a little larger (96,000) 
using the estimated need rather than demand for 
physician services.
6  These data are from IMS Health, as reported in 
the Wall Street Journal in October 2008.
7  Although Cooper, Getzen, and Laud (2003) per-
form a Granger causality test, they do not report 
the test result or explain it very clearly.  A Granger 
causality test is a way of determining whether A 
causes B and/or whether B causes A.
8  There have also been concerns about the validity 
of the American Medical Association’s Masterfile 
data set that is used by most people to develop 
estimates of future physician supply.  Staiger, 
Auerbach, and Buerhaus (2007) find that the 
Masterfile is inaccurate at both ends of the physi-
cian experience continuum.  Specifically, it sub-
stantially underestimates physician retirement and 
the size of new cohorts of physicians.
